We consider applications of Subset Product Problem (SPP) in number theory and cryptography. We obtain a probabilistic algorithm that attack SPP and we analyze it with respect time/space complexity and success probability. In fact we provide an application to the problem of finding Carmichael numbers and an attack to Naccache-Stern knapsack cryptosystem, where we update previous results.
Introduction
In the present paper we study the modular version of subset product problem (MSPP). We consider an application to number theory and cryptography. Furthermore, we shall provide an algorithm for solving MSPP based on birthday paradox attack. Finally we analyze the algorithm with respect to success probability and time/space complexity. Our applications concern the problem of finding Carmichael numbers and as far as the application on cryptography, we update previous results concerning an attack to the Naccache-Stern Knapsack (NSK) public key cryptosystem. We begin with the following definition.
We can define MSPP for a general abelian finite group G as following. We write G multiplicative. Definition 1.3 (Modular Subset Product Problem for G, MSPP G (P, c)). Given an element c ∈ G and a vector (u 0 , u 1 , ..., u n ) ∈ G n+1 , find a binary vector m = (m 0 , ..., m n ) such that,
Although in the present work we are interested in G = Z * Q where Q is highly composite number (the case of Carmichael numbers) or prime (the case of NSK cryptosystem).
1.1. Our Contribution. First we provide an algorithm for solving product subset problem based on birthday paradox. This approach is not new, for instance see [29, Section 2.3] . Here we use a variant of [4, Section 3] . We study and implement a parallel version of this algorithm. This result to an improvement of the tables provided in [4] . Further, except the cryptanalysis of NSK cryptosystem, we applied our algorithm to the searching of Carmichael numbers. We used a method of Erdős, to the problem of finding Carmichael numbers with many prime divisors. We managed to generate a Carmichael number with 19589 prime factors 1 . Finally, we provide an abstract version of the algorithm in [4, Section 3] , to the general product subset problem and further we analyze the algorithm as far as the selection of the parameters (this is provided in Proposition 2.2).
Roadmap. This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the attack to MSPP based on birthday paradox. We further provide a detailed analysis. Section 3 is dedicated to the problem of finding Carmichael numbers with many prime factors. We provide the necessary bibliography and known results. In the next section we obtain a second application of MSPP to Naccache-Stern Knapsack cryptosystem. In section 5 we provide experimental results. Finally, the last section contains some concluding remarks.
Birthday Attack to Modular Subset Product Problem
We call density of MSPP G (P, c) the positive real number d = |P| log 2 |G| .
where φ is the Euler totient function. In a MSPP G (P, c) having a large density, we expect to have many solutions. A straightforward attack uses birthday paradox paradigm to MSPP Λ (P, c). Rewriting equivalence (1.1) as for some α ≈ n/2, we construct two sets, say U 1 and U 2 . The first contains elements of the form α i=0 u mi i mod Λ, and the second c n i=α+1 u −mi i mod Λ, for all possible (binary) values of {m i } i . So, the problem reduces to finding a common element of sets U 1 and U 2 . Below, we provide the pseudocode of the previous algorithm.
Let y be an element of U 1 ∩ U 2 6: return u i : u i ≡ c mod Λ. 7: else return Fail : There is not any solution This algorithm is deterministic, since if there is a solution to MSPP Λ (P, c) the algorithm will find it. To construct the solution in step 6, we use the equation,
It turns out y = n i=0 u εi i mod Λ. This algorithm needs 2 n/2+1 elements of Z * Λ for storage. To compute the common element (in line 4) we first sort and then we apply binary search. Overall we need O(2 n/2 log 2 n) arithmetic operations in the multiplicative group Z * Λ . We can improve the previous algorithm as far as the space complexity. First, we need to define the notion of hamming weight of c. Let c ∈ Z * Λ . We set sol(c; P, Λ) = {I ⊂ {0, 1, ..., n} : c ≡ i∈I, ui∈P u i mod Λ}.
From this set we can easily build the set of all solutions of the MSPP Λ (P, c). Indeed, if J 1 , J 2 , ..., J k are all the sets in sol(c; P, Λ), then the set of solution is
We can simplify if we use the following characteristic function
such that χ(I) = (ε 0 , ε 1 , ..., ε n ), where ε i = 1 if i ∈ I else ε i = 0. Thus, the set of solutions Sol(c; P, Λ) = {(u ε0 0 , u ε1 1 , ..., u εn n ) : χ(I) = (ε 0 , ε 1 , ..., ε n ) for all I ∈ sol(c; P, Λ)}. To each element I of sol(c; P, Λ) (assuming there exists one) we correspond the natural number H I (c) = |I| (the cardinality of I). We call this number local Hamming weight of c at I. We call Hamming weight H(c) of c, the minimum of all these numbers. I.e.
Now, we consider two positive integers, say h 1 , h 2 , such that, h 1 + h 2 = H I (c), and two disjoint subsets I 1 , I 2 of {0, 1, . . . , n} with |I 1 | = |I 2 | = b, for some positive integer b ≤ n/2. Finally, we consider the sets,
We usually write them as U h1 (I 1 ) and U h2 (I 2 , c) when P, Λ are fixed. We have,
Remark 2.1. The set U 1 of Algorithm 1 is written,
Similar for U 2 .
For the following algorithm we assume that we know a local Hamming weight of the target number c. 
4:
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6:
If
Let y be an element of U * h1 (I 1 ) ∩ U * h2 (I 2 , c) 8:
return {u i } i such that u i ≡ c mod Λ and terminate 9: return Fail This algorithm is memory efficient version of algorithm 1, since we consider subsets of U 1 , U 2 . Although, this algorithm may fail, even when MSPP Λ (P, c) has a solution. For instance, if we pick I 1 , I 2 such that the union I 1 ∪I 2 ∈ sol(c; P, Λ), then the algorithm will fail. This may occur when b < n/2, that is I 1 ∪ I 2 ⊂ {0, 1, ..., n}. If I 1 ∪ I 2 = {0, 1, ..., n}, then I 1 ∪ I 2 ∈ sol(c; P, Λ). In this case, the algorithm remains probabilistic, since we consider a specific choice of (h 1 , h 2 ) and not all the possible (h 1 , h 2 ), with h 1 + h 2 = . If we consider all (h 1 , h 2 ) such that h 1 + h 2 = , then the algorithm is deterministic. In this case the analysis below is similar.
We analyze the algorithm line by line. Line 3: This can be implemented easily in the case where 2b < √ n. Indeed, we can use rejection sampling in the set {0, ..., n} and construct a list of length 2b. Then, I 1 is the set consisting from the first b elements and I 2 the rest. If 2b ≥ √ n then, we have to sample from the set {0, 1, ..., n}, so the memory increases since we have to store the set {0, 1, ..., n}. When we apply the algorithm to the searching of Carmichael numbers we indeed have 2b √ n. In the case of NSK cryptosystem we usually have 2b > √ n. Line 4: The most intensive part (both for memory and time complexity) is the construction of the set U * h1 . Here we can parallelize our algorithm to decrease time complexity. To reduce the space complexity we decrease the two parameters b ≤ n/2 and Q. If we do not truncate our hash function, then we store all the hex digits of the hash (usually 128-bits). In subsection 2.4 we provide a strategy to choose Q. Line 5-6: In Line 4 we stored U * h1 (I 1 ), in this line we compute on the fly the elements of the second set U * h2 (I 2 , c) and check if any is in U * h1 (I 1 ). So we do not need to store U * h2 . A suitable data structure for the searching is the hashtable, which we also used in our implementation. Hashtables have the advantage of the fast insert, delete and search operations. Since these operations have O(1) time complexity on the average. Line 7-8: Having the element found by the previous step (Line 6), say y, we construct the u i s such that their product is y. We return Fail if the intersection is empty for all the iterations. Remark 2.2. If we do not consider any hash function and Iter = 1, then we write
We implemented 3 the previous algorithm and in a few seconds we found a solution of MSPP Λ (P, c) for P = {2, 3, ..., 10 7 }, Λ = 10000019, c = 190238 with local hamming weight 11, b = 12 and iter = 150. We got the following solution: 2.1. Space complexity. We assume that there is not any collision in the construction of U * h1 (I 1 ) and U * h2 (I 2 , c), or in other words we choose Q to minimize the probability to have a collision. I.e. we choose 2 4Q max{|U 1 |, |U 2 |} and we assume that H is behaving random enough. In practice (or at least in our examples) we always have this constraint.
So we get,
We set
In our algorithm, we need to store the S b hashes of the set U * h1 (I 1 ). We need 4Q−bits for keeping Q−hex digits in the memory. So, overall we store 4QS b bits. Furthermore, we store the binary exponents (ε i ) i that are necessary for the computation of the products, i∈I1 u εi i . This is needed, since we must reconstruct c as a product of (u i ) i . These are S b , thus we need b × S b − bits. Since we also need to store the set P of length n + 1, we conclude that, If we can describe in an efficient way the set P we do not need to store it. Say, that P = {2, 3, ..., n}. Then, there is no need to store it in the memory, since the sequence f (x) = x + 1 describes efficiently the set P. Also, in other situations B can be stored using O(|P| log 2 (|P|)) bits. We call such sets nice and they can save us enough memory. In fact, for nice sets the inequality (2.2) changes to,
In fact when we apply this algorithm to the problem of finding Carmichael numbers, we shall see that the set P is nice.
Finally, if U h1 is very large we can make chunks of it, to store it in the memory. Note that this can not be done if we directly compute the intersection of U h1 ∩ U h2 as in [4] . This simple trick considerable improves the algorithms in [4] .
Time complexity.
Time complexity is dominated by the construction of the sets U h1 and U h2 and the calculation of their intersection. We work with U h1 instead of U * h1 since all the multiplications are between the elements of U h1 , only in the searching phase we move to U * h1 . Let M Λ be the bit-complexity of the multiplication of two integers mod Λ. So
for some 0 < ε ≤ 1 (for instance Karatsuba suggests ε = log 2 3 − 1 [19] ). In fact recently was proved M Λ = O(log 2 Λ log 2 (log 2 Λ)) [16] . To construct the sets U h1 and U h2 (ignoring the cost for the inversion mod Λ) we need
Considering the time complexity for finding a collision in the two sets by using a hashtable, we get
in the worst case. We used that h 1 ≈ h 2 (they differ at most by 1). In case we have T threads we get about T/T (bit operations) instead of T. 
For the proof see [4, section 3] . We can easily provide another and simpler proof in the case 2b = n + 1 (this occurs very often when attacking Naccache-Stern cryptosystem). Then,
where hyper is the hypergeometric distribution,
Where, • N = n + 1 is the population size • is the number of draws • b is the number of successes in the population • x is the number of observed successes Adapting to our case, we set N = 2b(= n + 1), (= h 1 + h 2 ) and x = h 1 . Then,
The expected value is b n+1 and since b = (n + 1)/2 we get EX = 2 . Since the random variable X counts the successes we expect on average to have /2 after considering enough instances (i.e. choices of I 1 , I 2 ). The maximum value of is n/2. So in this case the expected value is maximized. So we expect our algorithm to find faster a solution from another one that uses smaller value for .
Also, we need about
iterations on average to find a solution.
One last remark is that the contribution of b is larger than the contribution of hamming weight, in the probability P. We finally normalized the values by taking logarithms. So, for a given (b, h), if we want to increase the probability is better strategy to increase b than h.
2.3.1. The best choice of h 1 and h 2 . The choice of h 1 , h 2 (in line 1 of algorithm 1(a)) is h 1 = /2 , h 2 = /2 . This can be explained easily, since these values maximize the probability P of Lemma 2.1. We set
Observe that ( /2 , /2 ) ∈ J . Proposition 2.2. Let b and n be fixed positive integers such that = x + y ≤ b ≤ n/2. Then the finite sequence P : J → Q, defined by
is maximized for (x, y) = ( /2 , /2 ).
We need the following simple lemma.
Proof. It is straightforward by expressing the binomial coefficients in terms of factorials and rearranging them.
of Proposition 2.2. . From the previous lemma we have
Since b, are fixed, the maximum of the right hand side is at x = /2 . Indeed, both sequences b
x and 2b− b−x are positive and maximized at x = /2 . So also the product x 2b− b−x is maximized at x = /2 . The same occurs to the left hand side. Since the denominator of the left hand side in (2.4) is fixed, the numerator
Since n is also a fixed positive integer, the numerator of P is maximized at x = /2 and so P is maximized at the same point. Finally, − /2 = /2 = y. The Proposition follows.
2.4.
How to choose Q. If we are searching for r−same objects to one set (with cardinality n), when we pick the elements of the set from some largest set (with cardinality m), then we say that we have a r−multicollision. We have the following Lemma.
Lemma 2.4. If we have a set with m elements and we pick randomly (and independently) n elements from the set, then the expected number of r−mullticolisions is approximately
Proof. [18, section 6.2.1] Say we use md5 hash function. If we use the parameter Q, we have to truncate the output of md5, which has 16−hex strings, to Q−hex strings (Q < 16). I.e we only consider the first κ = 4 · Q-bits of the output. Our strategy to choose Q uses formula (2.5). In practice, is enough to avoid r = 3−multicollisions in the set
We set the formula (2.5) equal to 1 and we solve with respect to m, which in our case is m = 2 κ . So,
. For instance if we have local Hamming weight ≤ 13, b = n/2, |I 1 | = |I 2 | = b, and n = 232, we get κ ≈ 52. So, Q ≈ 13. In fact we used Q = 12 in our attack to Naccache-Stern knapsack cryptosystem.
Carmichael Numbers
Fermat proved that if p is a prime number, then p divides a p − a for every integer a. This is known as Fermat's Little Theorem. The question if the converse is true has negative answer. In fact in 1910 Carmichael noticed that 561 provides such a counterexample. A Carmichael number 4 is a positive composite integer n such that a n−1 ≡ 1 (mod n) for every integer a, with 1 < a < n and gcd(a, n) = 1. They named after Robert Daniel Carmichael (1879 Carmichael ( -1967 . Although, the Carmichael numbers between 561 and 8911 i.e. the first seven, initially they discovered by the Czech mathematician V.Simerka in 1885 [37] . In 1910 Carmichael conjectured that there is an infinite number of Carmichael numbers. This conjecture was proved in 1994 by Alford, Granville, and Pomerance [2] . Although, the problem if there are infinitely many Carmichael numbers with exactly R ≥ 3 prime factors, is remained open until today. We have the following criterion. For a simple elegant proof see [9] . We define the following function. If p i is odd prime and a i positive integer λ(p ai i ) = φ(p ai i ). If n = p a1 1 p a2 2 · · · p a k k then λ(n) = lcm λ(p a1 1 ), λ(p a2 2 ), . . . , λ(p a k k ) . Korselt's criterion can be written as Proposition 3.2. (Carmichael, 1912, [7] ) n is Carmichael if and only if is composite and n ≡ 1 (mod λ(n)).
Using the previous, we can prove that a Carmichael number is odd and have at least three prime factors. Furthermore, we can calculate some Carmichael numbers (the first 16): 561, 1105, 1729, 2465, 2821, 6601, 8911, 10585, 15841, 29341, 41041, 46657, 52633, 62745, 63973, and 75361. In [3] they used an idea of Erdős [10] to find Carmichael numbers with many prime factors. In 1996, Loh and Niebuhr [22] provided a Carmichael with 1, 101, 518 prime factors using Erdős heuristic algorithm (Algorithm 1). Also, an analysis and some refinements of [22] and an extension to other pseudoprimes was provided by Guillaume and Morain in 1996 in [14] . Further, in the same paper the authors provided a Carmichael number having 5104 prime factors. In 2014 [3, For an illustration of our algorithm we also generated some tables for Carmichael numbers having many prime factors 5 . For instance we produced Carmichael numbers up to 250 prime factors. Each instance was generated in some seconds. Also Carmichael numbers with 11725 and 19589 prime factors were generated in some hours with our algorithm, in a small home PC (I3/16Gbyte) using a C++/gmp implementation.
The following method is based on Erdős idea [10] . It was used in [3, 22] to produce Carmichael numbers having large number of prime factors. 
Correctness.
It is enough to prove that the numbers returned in steps 5 and 8 are Carmichael. Set n = p∈S p. We shall prove it for step 5. The set S contains all the primes of P such that their product is equivalent to 1 (mod Λ). Since |S| ≥ 2, n is composite and also is squarefree. Say a prime p is such that p|n. Since n ≡ 1 (mod Λ) i.e. Λ|n − 1 we get p − 1|n − 1. Indeed, this is immediate since p − 1|Λ. From Korselt's criterion we get that n is Carmichael. Similar for the step 8.
We have set = local hamming. In case of success, the output of the algorithm is a Carmichael number with or |P| − prime factors. In fact, if we want to calculate a Carmichael number with many prime factors, we can ignore the lines 4 and 5 and consider a large set P. An estimation for |P| was given in [22, formula 4] ,
In lines 1 and 2 we initialize the algorithm. Since in practice r is not large enough, both these steps are very efficient.
In line 3 we calculate the set P. One way to construct this set is the following. Say d|Λ. If d + 1 is prime with d + 1 ∈ Q then d ∈ P. To find the divisors of Λ having their prime divisors is a simple combinatorial problem. We can implement this without using much memory. Even better, we can use [3, Section 8] where they keep only the exponents of the divisors of Λ. Since the set P contains integers of the form 2 a1 3 a2 · · · p ar r + 1 with 0 ≤ a i ≤ h i , instead of storing 2 a1 3 a2 · · · p ar r + 1 we can store (a 1 , ..., a r ). Overall 8r|P| bits or r|P| bytes. So the set P is nice, since the set B in formula (2.2) needs O(|P| log 2 (|P|)) bits for storage.
In line 4 (and 7), we use algorithm 1(a) with b = bound and = local hamming according to the user choice. We can apply BA MSPP with the parameters Q and Iter, BA MSPP Λ (P, c; b, , Q, Iter). In [22] they picked T randomly from P. Remark 3.1. In [3] they used another algorithm inspired by the quantum algorithm of Kuperberg and they exploit the distribution of the primes in the set P (which is not uniform).
Remark 3.2. When |P| is large enough then using B = 1 as target number we can easily find a Carmichael number with small number of prime factors (by using small local Hamming weight). If we use B > 1 as in line 5 we get a Carmichael number with many prime factors. As we remarked previous the number of prime factors of the Carmichael number is either or |P| − . One advantage of the algorithm is that we can search for Carmichael numbers near |P| − r. This can be done by considering = local hamming close to r. In this way we quickly generated Carmichael numbers up to 250 prime factors in a small PC.
Naccache-Stern Knapsack Cryptosystem
In this section we consider a second application of MSPP to cryptography. We shall provide an attack to a public key cryptosystem. Naccache-Stern Knapsack (NSK) cryptosystem is a public key cryptosystem ( [29] ) based on the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP), which is a difficult number theory problem. Furthermore, it is based on another combinatorial problem, the Modular Subset Product Problem. Our attack applies to the latter problem. NSK cryptosystem is defined by the following three algorithms.
i. Key Generation:
Let p be a large safe prime number (that is p = 2q + 1, where q is a prime number). Let n denotes the largest positive integer such that:
where p i is the (i+1)−th prime. The message space of the system is M = {0, 1} n+1 , this is the set of the binary strings of (n + 1)−bits. For instance, if p has 2048 bits, then n = 232 and if p has 1024 bits, then n = 130. We randomly pick a positive integer s < p − 1, such that gcd(s, p − 1) = 1. This last property guarantees that there exists the (unique) s−th root mod p of an element in Z * p . Set
The public key is the vector (p, n; u 0 , ..., u n ) ∈ Z 2 × (Z * p ) n+1 and the secret key is s.
ii. Encryption:
Let m be a message and n i=0 2 i m i its binary expansion. The encryption of the n + 1 bit message m is c = n i=0 u mi i mod p. iii. Decryption: To decrypt the ciphertext c, we compute
From the description of the NSK scheme, we see that the security is based on the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP). It is sufficient to solve u x i = p i in Z * p , for some i. The best algorithm for computing DLP in prime fields has subexponential bit complexity, [1, 13] . Thus, for large p (at least 2048 bits) the system can not be attacked by using the state of the art algorithms for DLP.
We have also assumed that the prime number p belongs to the special class of safe primes to prevent attacks such as, Pollard rho [33], Pollard p−1 algorithm [32], Pohlig-Hellman algorithm [31] or any similar procedure that exploits properties of p − 1.
So we can apply BA MSPP Λ with input P = (u i ) i and c and for some bound b and hamming weight of the message m say H m i.e. the number of 1 s in the binary message m. So in this attack we assume that we know the hamming weight or an upper bound of it. To be more precise, this attack is feasible only for small or large hamming weights. Our parallel version allow us to consider larger hamming weights than in [4] .
In the following algorithm we call algorithm 1(a), where we execute steps 4 and 5 in parallel (in function BA MSPP Λ ) The case of knowing some bits of the message. If we know the position of some bits of the message m (for instance by applying a fault attack to the system may leak some bits), then we can improve our attack. In this case, we choose I 1 and I 2 in algorithm 4, from the set {0, 1, .., n} − K, where the set K contains the positions of the known bits. Also, in line 10, when we reconstruct the message m (in case of a collision) we need to put the known bits to the right positions.
Experimental results for NS
In our implementation 6 we used C/C++ with GMP library [15] and for parallelization OpenMP [30] . We used 20 threads of an Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2630 v4 @2.20GHz, in a Linux platform.
First, in Table 2 . We used b = n/2, Q = 12, where n = 84, 130 and 232, for len(p) = 600, 1024 and 2048 bits, respectively. For each column, we executed 10 times the attack of [4] and our parallel version (algorithm 4), and we computed the average CPU time.
Conclusions
In the present work we considered a parallel algorithm to attack the modular version of product subset problem. This is a NP-complete problem which have many applications in computer science and mathematics. Here we provide two applications, one in number theory and the other to cryptography.
First we applied our algorithm (providing a C++ implementation) to the the problem of searching Carmichael numbers. We managed to find one with 19589 factors in a small PC in 3 hours.
For the Naccache-Stern knapsack cryptosystem we updated and extended previous experimental cryptanalytic results provided in [4] . The new bounds for H m concern messages having Hamming weight ≤ 11 or ≥ 223, for n = 232. This is proved by providing experiments. But, our attack is feasible for Hamming weight Table 3 . Extension of table 2. For the case H m = 13, Q = 12, and len(p) = 1024 we used b = 60 instead of b = n 2 = 65. For the case H m = 11 and len(p) = 2048 we used b = n/2 − 23 = 93. For all other cases we used b = n 2 . The last row, Average Rounds, is the (average) round that eventually our algorithm terminates. Theoretically is approximately 1 P (see Lemma 2.1). Figure 2 . The horizontal axis is the hamming weight H m and the vertical axis is the cpu time in seconds (for the parallel attack). Using FindFit of Mathematica [38] , we computed the following approximation formulas that best fit to our data, T 600 (H m ) = 0.003 · e 0.71Hm , T 1024 (H m ) = 0.029·e 0.76Hm and T 2048 (H m ) = 0.74·e 0.9Hm (seconds).
≤ 15 or ≥ 219. The NSK cryptosystem system could resist to this attack, if we consider Hamming weights in the interval [17, 217] .
